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Overview 
Last year, I set out to manage a $20,000 stock portfolio, applying the 
straightforward investing approach of legends Warren E. Buffett, the second richest man 
in the world, and Benjamin Graham, Buffett's infamous mentor. Rather than speculating 
about what price a security will sell for in the future, value investing demands a focus on 
the underlying fundamental value of a business. Instead of relying on quantitative 
models or crystal balls, it relies on common sense and emotional discipline-virtues 
often absent from Wall Street. 
By outlining my individual investing decisions, the logic behind them, and the 
results, I hope to demonstrate the extraordinary wisdom of this simple, yet wildly 
unpopular, investing philosophy. Of course, I made several mistakes along the way, and 
I hope to address these and to provide thoughts for improvement. 
It is also important to note that I make no grand assumptions about my 
performance or its sustainability. In reality, a one-year record is not indicative of long-
term potential, as any fool can be lucky in the short -term. However, only a sound 
investment philosophy and outstanding ability can consistently outperform long-term. 
Hopefully, through my demonstration of clear logic and solid performance, I can validate 
the methodology to some degree. For my absolute confidence in value investing, I rely 
on the wisdom and performance of famed investors Benjamin Graham and Warren E. 
Buffett. 
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Icons of Value Investing 
Benjamin Graham is hailed as the "father of value investing," and rightly so. This 
renowned investor, professor at Columbia University, and even classical scholar single-
handedly rationalized Wall Street. 
While Graham managed his partnership, the "Benjamin Graham Joint Account," 
in the 1920s, he sought to buy stocks that were selling far below the actual value of the 
underlying businesses.25 The idea was to get stocks so ridiculously cheap, that most 
downside risk would be eliminated. Graham wanted to buy $1 worth of stocks for $0.50. 
This was a sharp contrast to the speculative nature of Wall Street, whose primary interest 
was to trade little pieces of paper with no more consideration than what price the next 
sucker would pay. A typical "investor" on Wall Street would pay $2 for $1 of stocks as 
long as he thought he could sell it for $3 the next day. This irrationality and emotional 
exuberance pushed equity prices to incredible highs, ultimately resulting in the great 
Crash. Graham's prudent and rational style of investing helped him escape the early 
stages of the Crash with a tolerable 20% loss. However, convinced that things could not 
get much worse, he bought on margin, subsequently losing 70% of his partnership's 
value. 25 
His later endeavor, Graham-Newman, was much more successful. Over the 
partnership's 21-year life (1936-1956), Graham-Newman demonstrated an astounding 
average yearly return of just below 17%, which contrasts to less than 14% for the S&P 
500 over the same period.27 While spectacular, this return figure neglects one of the 
company's most successful investments, GEl CO-whose shares were distributed to 
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shareholders. Assuming that these investors held the GEICO shares, their participation in 
f 27 Graham-Newman would have earned them a return that doubled that 0 the S&P 500. 
Security Analysis, which Graham co-authored, emerged in 1934. At the time, the 
same "investors" that had once seen the stock market as a place of infinite opportunity 
refused to consider stocks as investments at all. Graham, unlike most of Wall Street, 
recognized the cyclical nature of human emotion. Security Analysis identifies the 
"intrinsic value" of a company as independent of the market's quoted price. In the short-
term, the market is a "voting machine," in which people make decisions based on facts as 
well as the whims of emotion. However, in the long-term, the market will ultimately act 
more like a "weighing machine," where a company's competitive position, assets, and 
earnings are accurately "weighed" and reflected in a logical market quote2 Gross 
misstatements of price resulting from skewed investor psychology create opportunities 
for the value investor in the short-term. The idea is to buy a business based on calculated 
intrinsic value, and to wait for the market to take note over time. 
Ben Graham further detailed his investing philosophy in The Intelligent Investor 
(key ideas are discussed below), which Warren Buffett describes as "by far the best book 
on investing ever written.,,14 Indeed, it changed the life of 19-year-old Buffett in 1950 
when he first read it. 
Buffett had traded stocks since he was eleven, and unsuccessfully so. He had 
tried his share of stock tips and chart analyses, but he found a logical alternative to such 
unsuccessful speculation in Graham's simple and straightforward methodologies. 14 
Buffett later studied under Graham at Columbia University (earning the only A+ ever 
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C 26 B ffi granted by Graham) and even worked for Graham at Graham-Newman orp. u ett 
was enamored with Graham's sensible instruction. He had literally found an idol. 
To say that Warren Buffett has been a successful value investor would be a gross 
understatement. In less than half a century, he has successfully turned a $10,000 nest egg 
into a $42,900,000,000 empire, making him the second richest man in the world-second 
only to his good friend Bill Gates. 16 
His extraordinary record can be tracked through the performance of his 
investment vehicle, Berkshire Hathaway. From 1964, when Buffett took the company 
over, until 2003, the per-share book value of Berkshire increased a total of 259,485% 
compared to a 4,743 increase in the S&P 500, dividends included. This equates to a 
22.2% average annual gain vs. 10.4% for the S&P.5 The price appreciation of Berkshire 
has been even more phenomenal, climbing from around $19 when Buffett took over in 
1964 to over $93,000 on April 25, 2004. This represents a total return of nearly 
490,000% and an average annual return of over 24%30 
Key Principles of Value Investing 
In an October 2003 presentation to University of Tennessee business students, 
Warren Buffett explained that successful investing can be achieved through the 
application of three simple ideas-stocks as part of a business, Mr. Market, and margin 
of safety. All of these ideas are demonstrated in Graham's The Intelligent Investor. 
Buffett stresses the importance of each, stating, "You can't get rid of one leg of a three-
legged stool and have a sound investment philosophy.,,14 
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Stocks as Part of a Business: 
A stock is ultimately a share in a business, giving the owner a claim against the 
assets and income of an enterprise. Thus, it only makes sense for an investor to be 
concerned with the fundamental prospects of the underlying business, not simply the 
price behavior of its quoted shares. 
Buffett admits, 
"1 used to know, when 1 was eleven or twelve, the ticker symbol of every company virtually on the 
New York Stock exchange [ ... ] but 1 didn't know what was behind them. 1 had to start looking at 
these little symbols and names in the paper as businesses and decide how you value a business 
[ ... ] and what counts" 14 
Buffett was only a child when he made this silly mistake. Amazingly, educated 
Wall Street professionals are often completely oblivious to the nature or value of the 
businesses underlying the stocks they are trading. As Graham and Dodd state in Security 
Analysis, "It is an almost unbelievable fact that Wall Street never asks, 'How much is the 
business selling for?'" 4 
In The Intelligent Investor, Graham addresses this issue in a telling distinction 
between a silent partner in a private business and a common stockholder. The private 
investor would concern himself solely with the prospects of the business, and would 
determine the value of his investment by calculating his relative share of the company's 
balance sheet items and expected earnings. On the other hand, the common stock 
investor, although in a very similar position, is alienated from his ownership in the 
business simply because his interest can be sold or purchased at whim. Because he has 
the luxury of a liquid market with readily quoted prices, the investor behaves more like a 
speculator. As graham puts it, 
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"The speculator's primary interest lies in anticipating and profiting from market fluctuations. The 
investor's primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices." 18 
Thus as investors we need to focus on the intrinsic value of our ownership in the , , 
underlying business and only concern ourselves with quoted prices when it is convenient 
for us to do so. 
It is important to note that while Ben Graham focused solely on the numbers to 
value an enterprise, Buffett places a special emphasis on understanding the factors that 
make a particular business special. Buffett wants predictability in his investments, even 
demanding that he have an idea of what a company will look like, say, ten years down the 
road. Buffett explains in his 1992 Letter to Shareholders: 
"[W]e try to stick with businesses we believe we understand. That means they must be relatively 
simple and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to constant change, we're not 
smart enough to predict future cash flows." 10 
This is precisely why Buffett avoids high-tech companies. Indeed, none of Berkshire 
Hathaway's subsidiaries or equity holdings are "sexy" investments by any stretch of the 
imagination. But as Buffett notes in his 1987 Letter to Shareholders: 
"Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix ... [T]he best business returns are usually 
achieved by companies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five 
,,7 
or ten years ago ... 
Certainly, the inflation and subsequent deflation of the dot-com bubble, contrasted with 
Buffett's consistently superior historical investment performance, validates this 
affirmation. 
In addition to simplicity and understandability, Buffett finds great predictability in 
companies that have a durable competitive advantage, which Buffett metaphorically 
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describes as a "moat around an economic castle." 14 The very nature of capitalism breeds 
competition. Everyone is trying to get what somebody else has. A company cannot 
sustain any extraordinary profitability in the long-term if it is vulnerable to competitive 
actions of other companies. A moat prevents, or at least delays, other companies from 
attacking an economic castle. A great example of a competitive moat is Wal-Mart, which 
enjoys an incredibly low cost structure through its massive economies of scale. Nobody 
can compete with Wal-Mart because nobody is large enough to realize enough cost 
savings to compete on price. At the Fall 2004 meeting with UT students, Buffett 
explained that a "moat" could even be something as intangible as an idea that consumers 
have about a particular company or its products. He elaborates, "There are six billion 
people in the world. Practically all of them have something in their mind about Coca-
Cola, largely favorable. They don't have anything in their mind about RC Cola, and if 
RC Cola spent $1 billion advertising they wouldn't have anything in their mind about RC 
Cola ... That's an enduring competitive advantage." 14 
Mr. Market: 
Ben Graham offers a simple, logical framework for dealing with market 
fluctuations in his famous Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor, and does so through his 
personification of the market, Mr. Market. 
Graham explains in his famous allegory: 
"Imagine that in some private business you own a small share that cost you $1.000. One of your 
partners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed. Every day he tells you what he thinks your 
interest is worth and furthermore offers to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that 
basis. Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible .... Often, on the other hand, Mr. Market lets 
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his enthusiasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes to you seems to you a 
little short of silly." 21 
Buffett takes the description of Mr. Market one-step further, even referring to him 
as an "alcoholic manic-depressive,,14 The idea here is that people are emotional beings, 
and they often let their emotions run away with them. This human trait is common in 
both individuals and in crowds, which translates into extreme volatility in markets. At 
his UT presentation, Buffett noted how remarkable the stock market is, explaining that 
even the best American companies often sell at yearly highs that are twice the value of 
the lows. Such variation in perceived value would rarely occur in, say, the value of a 
home or any other non-traded asset. 
When people are excited, they tend to become irrational on the upside, trading 
securities for often astronomical values. This was certainly the case during the dot-com 
"craze" of the late 90s. Companies such as Yahoo.com were selling for hundreds of 
times their expected earnings, and the reality is that most of these companies were losing 
money. While the opportunities opened up by the Internet are certainly fantastic, Wall 
Street became overly euphoric. In fact, even though dot-com stock prices certainly 
seemed to exceed value by all traditional measures, seemingly intelligent, well-educated 
analysts were hopelessly justifying their buy recommendations based on ridiculous 
measures of the "new economy," such as price-to-sales ratios and revenue growth-all of 
which neglect the ultimate goal of investors: profit. It is clear that in such euphoria, 
instead of buying stocks with consideration of company fundamentals and earnings 
potential, people soon begin to buy stocks simply because the prices are rising, hoping to 
sell their already expensive shares to the next sucker that comes along at an even higher 
price. The result is a vicious cycle. 
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As Graham would have predicted, though, the exponential price performances of 
the dot-com companies were equally spectacular on the downside. As stated in Security 
Analysis: 
"That enormous profits should have turned into still more colossal losses, that new theories should 
have been developed and later discredited, that unlimited optimism should have been succeeded 
by the deepest despair are all in strict accord with age-old tradition." 3 
Indeed, at the end of 1999, Yahoo.com closed at a split-adjusted price of $216. 
The following year, it sold for $30, later selling for $8. The NASDAQ itself reached a 
peak of over 5,000 in 2000, falling dramatically to under 1,500 over the subsequent three 
years.30 The lesson here is that irrational bull markets are not sustainable, and investors 
will sooner or later take note of reality. This was a painful lesson to learn for many 
people who lost entire fortunes during the dot-com bubble. Buffett and Graham, 
however, would stress that the lesson has not bean learned, and that people will behave 
just as irrationally again. 
It is important to note that fear can drive the stocks to irrationally low prices just 
as greed and excitement can drive them to astronomically high prices. Consider, for 
instance, the investing climate after the great Crash. In 1934, Security Analysis 
recognized that stocks were largely discredited as an investment at all. Because people 
were fearful about the possibility of another Crash, what had been seen as the land of 
infinite opportunity and riches (Wall Street) was largely being avoided by investors 
altogether. As Graham noted in a June 1932 Forbes article, many companies were selling 
for less than their cash in the bank. 17 
While Graham saw value in the 1932 market, most of Wall Street did not. Why 
so? A common misconception is that the market serves to instruct or give signals to 
Ruble 11 
investors. Indeed, many people buy because prices rise or sell because they decline. 
Because prices had declined from steep highs in the Crash, investors saw the potential for 
loss, neglecting even to consider the incredible value that the low prices represented. 
Graham points out that this defies all common business sense, for profit maximization 
requires buying low and selling high. By reacting to fluctuations in such a manner, 
investors are, "perversely transforming [their] basic advantage into a basic disadvantage." 
20 
By demonstrating emotional discipline, the value investor can take advantage of 
such market folly. As Buffett notes in the preface of The Intelligent Investor, "The sillier 
the market's behavior, the greater the opportunity for the business-like investor."vii The 
great thing about Mr. Market is that an investor does not have to accept his offer unless it 
is advantageous. Every day, he will come along with a new one. The intelligent investor 
will catch Mr. Market on a bad day and, essentially, rip the poor drunk off 
Margin of Safety: 
The margin of safety concept is the crux of sound investing. In Graham's famous 
Chapter 21 of The Intelligent Investor he states, "[To] distill the secret of sound investing 
into three words, we venture the motto, MARGIN OF SAFETY." 23 
Basically, Graham suggests that an investor should buy a company at a deep 
discount to its intrinsic value. While bargain hunting certainly seems like a no-brainer 
recommendation, how can an investor ever know whether or not he or she is buying 
$1.00 for $0.50? The answer is simple: one does not know! 
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The problem is that investors have to make heroic assumptions in determining the 
intrinsic value of a company (see Valuation Model section below). Without a crystal ball 
that actually works, nobody can know for sure how profitable a company will be in the 
future. Unknown factors such as catastrophic litigation, changing industry dynamics, and 
corporate fraud can seriously impede future earnings growth ... if not even bankrupt an 
enterprise. Moreover, the lay investor only has limited access to company information 
and, thus, may have difficulty in deriving appropriate estimates in the first place. 
Leaving some "cushion" room to compensate for this ambiguity is only logical. By 
demanding a discount to calculated intrinsic value, an investor is protecting him or 
herself against inevitable uncertainty. 
Buffett explains this simple logic in his appendix to The Intelligent Investor, "The 
Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville": 
"You don't try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an 
enonnous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only 
drive 10, OOO-pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing." 24 
My Portfolio 
On February 11, 2003, I began investing $20,000 through an online brokerage 
account with Ameritrade, Inc. With no personal investing experience and no professional 
advice, I produced a twelve-month return of 56.70% (after brokerage fees), beating the 
vast majority of professionally managed equity funds. This return compares to a 41.79% 
return for the S&P 500 over the same twelve-month period (February 11, 2003 -
February 11, 2004). 
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*Note that the S&P 500 is the most appropriate benchmark with which to compare my investing results. This 
capitalization-weighted index includes 500 companies that span every part of the U.S economy. By tracking its performance, 
investors can approximate the average return of U.S. equities, and, thus, have a good measure of alternative investment opportunities. 
In contrast, the Dow includes only 30 large industrial companies, and the NASDAQ is largely comprised of small. obscure companies. 
Moreover, the risk/reward profiles of these two indexes are largely skewed, as the Dow is very conservative, while the NASDAQ is 
very risky. Note that an investor would have assumed more risk (possibility of loss) to achieve the higher returns that the NASDAQ 
produced over this 12-month period. Given the volatile nature of the NASDAQ and its components. this short-term performance 
might not be indicative oflong-term results. 
Below, I describe the factors that contributed to this performance, the logic of 
some of my individual decisions, and a multitude of dumb mistakes. 
Concentration versus Diversification: 
At any given time, I held no more than eleven different stocks in my portfolio. 
Notice the table depicting my 2/1112004 
Symbol Price Shares Value Weight 
portfolio on the last day of the KO $ 51.80 50 $ 2,590.00 8.26% 
PFE $ 38.15 50 $ 1,907.50 6.09% 
investment period. Not only was GE $ 33.08 75 $ 2,481.00 7.92% 
HD $ 36.83 75 $ 2,762.25 8.81% 
my entire account invested in just BRK.B $ 3,057.00 1 $ 3,057.00 9.75% 
HDI $ 53.36 40 $ 2,134.40 6.81% 
ten companies, but I was also very HCA $ 43.89 65 $ 2,852.85 9.10% CAH $ 65.75 78 $ 5,128.50 16.36% 
HMC $ 21.62 230 $ 4,972.60 15.87% 
willing to commit substantial TAP.B $ 18.20 175 $ 3,185.00 10.16% 
capital to a select few. In fact, Cash $ 268.01 0.86% 
almost one third of my entire Total: $ 31,339.11 100.00% 
portfolio was invested in just two companies, Cardinal Health (CAR) and Honda Motor 
Company (HMC) 
This is in sharp contrast with academia's view that a portfolio should be widely 
diversified, often suggesting more than thirty stocks. The simple logic here is iterated in 
the old saying, "Don't put all your eggs in one basket." By spreading funds over many 
Ruble 14 
holdings, an investor reduces the risk of loss. If one "basket" falls, then all of the eggs 
are broken, and nobody wants that. 
Buffett would argue otherwise. In his 1978 Letter to Shareholders, he states: 
"Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are 
only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness. we 
believe in buying worthwhile amounts." 6 
By following a concentration strategy, an investor will be much more successful 
if he or she can select sound investments. Of course, successful concentration depends 
on the time, effort, and skill an investor is willing to devote to researching and 
understanding businesses. An enterprising investor can actually reduce risk by 
concentrating in a handful of stocks. This is certainly contrary to statistical theory, but 
the idea makes perfect sense. By holding only a handful of companies, an investor can 
exercise a much deeper and more sophisticated understanding of the positions held. With 
this superior knowledge, an investor can make much more rational decisions, and can 
anticipate and monitor the business prospects and risk profile of specific companies. As 
long as the decisions are sound, concentration can be relatively safe. In a 1998 speech to 
the Foundation Financial Officers Group, Charlie Munger-Buffett's famed business 
partner and Vice Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway-stressed, "In the United States, a 
person or institution with almost all wealth invested, long-term, in just three fine 
domestic corporations is securely rich." 29 
On the other hand, if an investor is passive and is not willing to commit time and 
effort to carefully scrutinize and select individual securities, or if potential investments 
are particularly risky, then a diversification strategy makes sense. The more securities 
held in a single portfolio, the less any single mistake or loss will affect overall return. A 
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passive investor, however, can only expect to earn average returns. After all, the more 
diversified a portfolio is, the more it will emulate the broad market. 
Another argument for concentration is that good investment ideas are simply hard 
to come by. In his 1993 Letter to Shareholders, Buffett even claimed, "[W]e'll now settle 
for one good idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)" 11 When a "fat pitch" or "no-
brainer" (as he puts it) comes along, it makes sense to make a meaningful investment. If 
an investor does not commit heavily to his or her best ideas, remaining funds must be 
dispersed among less attractive opportunities. Again, in his 1993 Letter to Shareholders, 
Buffett comments: 
"1 cannot understand why an investor ... elects to put money into a business that is his 20th 
favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands 
best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential." 11 
* See the "Mistakes" section below for a description of my failure in pulling the 
trigger on my favorite investments. 
Valuation Model: 
To buy a company at a deep discount to its intrinsic value, an investor must have 
a framework for approximating this value. For my portfolio, I use a PricelEarnings 
model adopted by the University of Tennessee's TV A Investment Challenge team, which 
has been immensely successful in substantially beating the S&P 500 every year since its 
1998 inception. 
Essentially the model takes the current annual earnings of a company and projects 
them out five years into the future. The resulting future earnings figure is then applied to 
a future PricelEarnings ratio to derive a future price for the enterprise. This value is 
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discounted back to determine the present value of this future price. To account for 
dividend income, an annuity due function is applied in which future dividends are 
discounted back to their present value. The combined capital gains and dividend 
components result in an approximation of intrinsic value-which basically tells an 
investor what future cash flows are worth today after being discounted at an appropriate 
rate to account for risk and alternative investment opportunities. 
The applied formulas are as follows: 
where: "FV _Price" represents the future price ofthe stock 
"PE" represents the future price/earnings ratio 
"EPS" represents the most recent annual earnings per share figure 
"g" represents expected earnings growth rate 
"n" represents the holding period for the investment 
where: "PV _Price" represents the present value the future price 
"i" represents the periodic discount rate 
PV _Div = DN * (1 +~) * [(1- «1 + ~) / (1 + i))") / (i - g)] 
where: "PV _ Div" represents the present value of an annuity due for dividends 
"DIV' represents the current annual dividend -
"gd" represents the ex-pected growth rate for dividends 
Intrinsic Value = PV _Price + PV _ Div 
To simplifY these calculations, 
I use the TVA Investment Challenge 
team's excel-based model, as depicted 
here in my 2/10/2004 valuation of the 
Coca-Cola Company: 
Notice that in this particular 
case, I calculated an intrinsic value of 
Current Price 
Intrinsic Value 
Margin of Safety 
Expected Return 
FV Price 
PVDividend 
PVPrice 
Tangible Book Value 
P,iee' Book Value 
Current PIE 
Historic.1 P/E-
The Coca-Cola Co. (1<0) 
Future PIE 
EPS (Dec 02) 
Long Term Growth Rate 
Holding Period 
Current DiVidend 
Long Term Growth Rate 
Discount Rate 
25 
~1.75 -
1 1 --
5 
~8 1.08-11 
$3.26 
1212 
22.45 
36.75 
$39511 
$47791 
2095%1 
1442%1 
$70861 
$379\ 
$4400\ 
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$47.79, representing a 20.95% margin of safety. This value, however, is not intended to 
be extremely accurate. It should only serve as a guide for intelligent decision-making. 
To determine this intrinsic value, I had to make numerous assumptions about the 
company's future earning prospects, a possible future price/earnings ratio, and an 
appropriate discount rate. Even a slight change in any of these estimates leads to 
strikingly different calculations. 
For the earnings growth expectations, I typically rely heavily on the First Call 
consensus estimates, which can be obtained from Yahoo. com. This is essentially the 
average expectation of all Wall Street analysts covering the stock. If I suspect that 
analysts are overly optimistic, I typically reduce the rate by several hundred basis points 
for the sake of conservatism. While the Coca-Cola Company offered guidance for 
earnings growth of 11-12%, I felt that 10% was a more prudent assumption given the 
company's large size and the mature industry in which it operates. Had I assumed an 
earnings growth rate of 12%, the intrinsic value calculation would have jumped to 
$51.94, representing a 31.45% margin of safety. 
The future price/earnings assumptions are even more ambiguous. Essentially, this 
ratio represents what investors are willing to pay for every dollar of a particular 
company's earnings per share. Thus, this factor is entirely psychological. Since a value 
investor is not in the business of predicting investor sentiment, it only makes sense to 
analyze historical information and future prospects to derive a normalized PIE estimation. 
In the case of Coca-Cola, its 10-year historical PIE is 36.75 (average of highs and lows on 
S&P Stock Reports). This is huge premium to the broad market (selling for about 18 
times forward earnings on 4129/2004), but this premium is largely warranted due to Coca-
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Cola's durable competitive advantage (brand image and economies of scale), financial 
prowess, and consistent historical performance. Even so, I assume a much lower PIE 
multiple of 25x. Had I assumed a multiple of 30x, the valuation model would have 
yielded an intrinsic value of $56.59, representing a 43.22% margin of safety. However, 
my reduced estimate is only prudent, as a conservative investor should shy away from 
valuations that are contingent on extremely high PIE multiples, and thus investor 
optimism. 
Discount rate assumptions are also extremely fuzzy. This rate should reflect the 
return demanded by an investor for a company with a particular risk profile. In the 
TV AlC model, I typically assign a discount rate of 10% or so to the safest companies 
(like Coca-Cola), and vary the rate up to 15% for riskier companies. Admittedly, this is 
largely arbitrary and off the Wall. These figures are certainly larger than the 7% returns 
that Warren Buffett told UT students to expect over the next 40 years, but higher discount 
rates yield more conservative calculations. 14 Therefore, 10-15% discount rates seem to 
be quite sensible. 
The bottom line is that any intrinsic value calculation is going to be very fuzzy. 
This is precisely why an intelligent investor should demand a huge discount to intrinsic 
value. In fact, the margin should probably be so large that a precise calculation of value 
is not even necessary. At Berkshire Hathaway's 1996 Annual Shareholder Meeting, 
Buffett stated, 
"If you have to actually do it with pencil and paper. it's too close to think about. It ought to just 
kind of scream at you that you've got this huge margin of safety." 13 
Such was the case with my purchase of Sears (discussed below). 
Ruble 19 
Portfolio "Risk": 
Buffett is very critical of academia's definition of risk with respect to securities. 
Even the Investments course at the University of Tennessee (Finance 425) teaches 
students that beta is the appropriate measure of risk for individual securities. Beta is 
essentially measured by the coefficient (slope) of a regression that plots the historical 
performance of a particular company's stock against that of the broad market (S&P 500). 
For instance, if a stock has consistently risen 20% while the S&P 500 has gained 10% 
over a given period, the stock would have a beta of approximately 2.0. This high beta 
indicates that the stock is much more volatile than the overall market. If the S&P 500 
were to fall 10%, an academic would expect the stock to fall lose 20% of its value. 
Fundamentally, this makes absolutely no sense as a measure of "risk." Beta 
measures no more than a stock's volatility. An investor with a long-term focus should 
not be concerned by the manic depressive and alcoholic nature of Mr. Market. As long as 
an investor buys a business at a fair price, Mr. Market's changing attitude toward the 
individual pieces of that business should be of no concern to the investor. In fact, this 
"risk" is actually to the value investor's benefit, since volatile price behavior presents 
many opportunities for an investor to capitalize on Mr. Market's idiocy. 
What's more, by focusing solely on the price behavior of securities, academics 
entirely neglect the underlying characteristics of the businesses in which they are 
investing. Buffett elaborates in his 1993 Letter to Shareholders: 
"In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what accompany produces. what its 
competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer 
not to know the company's name." 11 
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This line of thinking is absurd. Buffett might say that it can be equated to watching a 
scoreboard instead of the baseball game itself or driving through the rearview mirror. 
In his appendix to The Intelligent Investor, "The Superinvestors of Graham-and-
Doddsville," Buffett further explains the absurdity of the beta measurement for risk by 
describing his investment in The Washington Post, which was selling for $80 million in 
the market and, as Buffett claims, was worth $400 million in assets alone: 
"[I]f the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of 
$80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people who think beta measures risk, the 
cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never 
been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million 
than $80 million." 24 
Indeed, the entire concept of a risk/reward tradeoff is largely skewed here. While 
academia teaches us that we must assume more "risk" if we are to expect greater returns, 
value investing demonstrates that buying stocks cheap can actually decrease risk (by 
minimizing potential loss) and increase profit potential simultaneously. Certainly, by 
buying The Washington Post at $40 million, Buffett could have achieved both of these 
ends. 
The invalidity of beta IS likewise demonstrated by my own investment 
2/1112004 
performance. As of Symbol Price Shares Value Weight Beta Weighted Beta 
KO $ 51.80 50 $ 2,590.00 8.26% 0.286 0.0236 
211112004, the weighted PFE $ 38.15 50 $ 1,907.50 6.09% 0.378 0.0230 GE $ 33.08 75 $ 2,481.00 7.92% 1.103 0.0873 
HD $ 36.83 75 $ 2,762.25 8.81% 1.401 0.1235 
average beta of my BRKB $ 3,057.00 1 $ 3,057.00 975% 0.415 0.0405 
HDI $ 53.36 40 $ 2,134.40 6.81% 1.095 0.0746 
personal portfolio HCA $ 43.89 65 $ 2,852.85 9.10% 0.15 0.0137 was CAH $ 65.75 78 $ 5,128.50 16.36% 0.105 0.0172 
HMC $ 21.62 230 $ 4,972.60 15.87% 0.531 0.0843 
approximately 0.55. If TAP.B $ 18.20 175 $ 3,185.00 10.16% 0.6 0.0610 
beta were 
Cash $ 268.01 0.86% 0 
an accurate 
Total: $ 31,339,11 100,00% 0.5486 
Ruble 21 
indicator of risk and, thus, expected relative perfonnance, my portfolio should have 
returned something along the lines of 22% (41% S&P 500 return multiplied by my .55 
beta). Thus, by achieving a return of over 56%, I actually earned money on risks that I 
did not even take! Academia might simply explain this "abnonnality" to be a freak 
occurrence. The intelligent investor knows better. 
A Quality Bias: 
An investor should have a preference for strong, high-quality companies. In his 
1989 Letter to Shareholders, Buffett declared, "It's far better to buy a wonderful company 
at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price." 8 If an investor pays too much 
for a great company, it is far more likely that the he will eventually recoup his 
investment. With a poor quality company, future prospects are not as predictable, and, 
thus, mistakes are much more painful. 
In building my portfolio, I made sure that I established a solid foundation of 
Purchases Value Line Metrics 
Symbol Financial Strength Earnings Predictability quality companies. In my first day 
KG A++ 85 
PFE A++ 100 of investing, I purchased Coca-
GE A++ 95 
HD A++ 90 Cola, General Electric, Pfizer, and 
BRK.b A+ 5 
MCD A++ 95 
~N A % 
Home Depot, all of which carried 
HDI A 100 
S A 85 high rankings Value Line's metrics 
H~ A ~ 
SNV B++ 100 for both financial strength and 
BAX A+ 85 
CAH A 100 earmngs predictability. I 
HMC B++ 75 
TAP.b B++ 5 maintained this commitment to 
quality throughout the investment period, and I am confident that this quality bias 
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significantly contributed to my performance. Indeed, two of my best performers were my 
high-quality holdings in Home Depot and McDonald's, returning 70.27% and 61.11% 
(after fees but excluding dividends), respectively. (See appendix for more detailed return 
information. ) 
Two Illustrations: MCD and S 
MCD: Before considering these two investments, it is important to understand that value 
investing is requires more common sense and simple thought than complex mathematical 
models and meticulous calculation. The logic behind a decision should be so simple that 
it can be explained in a few words. In his 1994 Letter to Shareholders, Buffett notes, 
"The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph." 12 
McDonald's enjoys one of the strongest brands in the world, generates tons of 
cash, and maintains a solid balance sheet. However, leading into 2003, the company's 
same-store sales began to suffer from poor quality, slow service, and an un-kept 
appearance at many of its locations, from a shift in eating preferences toward casual 
dining (Panera Bread, etc.) over fast food chains, and from growing social concerns over 
obesity and other health issues. Moreover, low-priced items (such as the dollar menu) 
were eating into margins due to a looming price war with Burger King. Needless to say, 
times were tough. 
All of these problems, to me, seemed to be short-term concerns. First of all, 
social trends shift all the time, so the obesity and casual dining factors had little to no 
influence on my long-term outlook for the company. Additionally, the price wars are 
common, and I expected that this too would normalize in the future. The main problem 
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was that management seemed incapable of keeping the company on top. The concerns 
over deteriorating quality and service were valid in that these issues could have seriously 
injured the company's strong brand image and, thus, long-term competitive advantage. 
Luckily, new management was already in place, and the new CEO, Jim Cantalupo, 
seemed very committed to dramatically improving the quality, service, and cleanliness at 
all existing restaurant locations. In short, it looked like this ship would soon turn around, 
and the company certainly had a fantastic capital structure to facilitate the process. 
Mr. Market, however, was back to his old self, off drinking somewhere in the 
corner. Mr. Market, in a drunken stupor, was only concerned with the short-term, unable 
to look past the most recent decline in same-store sales or quarterly earnings 
disappointment. This great company, which expected to earn $1.35 for the year, was 
selling for a mere $13.50. This represented a PIE multiple of just lOx. Not only did this 
contrast sharply to the 
McDonald's Corp. (MCD) 
Current Price 
company's historical PIE of Intrinsic Value 
23.3x, but it also traded at a steep 
discount to the broad market. 28 
Regardless of my 
estimates III valuing the 
company, it was obvious that 
MCD was a steal at $13.50. I 
calculated an intrinsic value of 
$21. 17, representing a whopping 
56.16% margin of safety. Not 
Margin of Safety 
Expected Return 
FV Price 
PVDividend 
PVPrice 
Tang. Book Value 
Price' Book Value 
Current PIE 
Historical PIE~ 
·Est. 2003 EPS is $1.35 
Future PIE 
EPS (Dec 02) 
Long Term Growth Rate 
Holding Period 
Current Dividend 
Long Term Growth Rate 
Discount Rate 
-First Call lists 8% future 5-yr growth) 
~Average of High/Low Averages for the last 10 years. 
17.5 
$1.32 
1.07 
5 
~.4 11 1.11 
$688 
1.97 
10.27 
23.3 
$13561 
$21171 
56WIoj 
2198%1 
$32401 
$1951 
$19231 
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only was 1 buying a wonderful company, but also 1 was buying it at a wonderful price. 
Looking at the chart, it is interesting to note the great price at which 1 purchased 
MCD. While 1 certainly bought near a low, 1 was not trying to make any grand 
MCDONALDS CORP 
as of 20-Apr-2004 
35 
40 
~ 30 
o 
::: 20 
...... 
Splits:'" 
£16~~~~~MI~~~II~~~uMMlMI~~~~W.~~bI~~~ 
Copyright 2004 Yahoo! Inc. http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
predictions about the price at which the stock would sell in the near future. 1 simply 
found great value in what 1 was getting for my money. Luckily, 1 did not have to wait 
long for Mr. Market to sober up. A momentum investor, on the other hand, would have 
seen my entry point as a horrible time to buy, simply because the stock had been on such 
a decline. Likewise, a momentum investor would have likely bought MCD at a later date 
after the stock had already risen substantially ... missing a great opportunity. 
Postscript: 1 purchased 100 shares of MCD at $13.56 and sold just four 
months later for $22.01 per share. This was a 61.11 % return. (I outline a couple of 
mistakes here in the "Mistakes" section below.) 
s: Sears was a rare "fat pitch" and "no-brainer." The company has been around for 
over a century, and is a household name, but in early March 2003, its stock was selling 
for less about 4x earnings! The company was expected to earn $4.89 in 2003 was paying 
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a $1 dividend per share. Yet, the stock was selling for under $22. Again, Mr. Market 
was scared to death about Sears' increasing default risk in its credit card portfolio, 
stronger competition in appliances from the likes of Best Buy and Home Depot, and 
weak results in the company's soft lines business. Additionally, the company was highly 
leveraged with a 79.5% debt/capital ratio. These fears were certainly legitimate, but the 
poor drunkard (Mr. Market) was basically giving his stock away. Moreover, Sears is a 
cash cow, so its dividend was stable, and the company could have easily met its debt 
obligations through refinancing or a simple securitization and liquidation of its credit card 
portfolio. The company was also well on its way to revitalizing its apparel business and 
had signed valuable exclusive contracts with Land's End and other popular outfitters. In 
short, Mr. Market was "making a mountain out of a molehill" as Ben Graham might say, 
and was grossly overcompensating for relatively short-term concerns. 
As Buffett would say, this presented a margin of safety that literally "screamed" 
at me. The stock was selling for an ENORMOUS discount to its historical PIE of 13.25. 1 
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO Splits: ... 
,I •• L_1 
. / " ... 
http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
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Postscript: I basically took advantage of Mr. Market's ignorance and bought 
100 shares of Sears at $21.95 per share, knowing very well that it was worth over $30. 
Sears soon announced that it was indeed selling its credit card portfolio, and the price 
jumped dramatically. I ended up selling three months after purchase for $33.76 and 
$39.10, representing an overall capital gain of64.72%. (I outline some mistakes below). 
Mistakes: 
While I did outperform the S&P 500, I did make several large mistakes that kept 
somewhat hindered my overall returns. I briefly outline these mistakes below. 
My most difficult challenge was in exercising emotional discipline. In The 
Intelligent Investor, Ben Graham suggests that "[an] investor with a portfolio of sound 
stocks should expect their prices to fluctuate and should neither be concerned by sizable 
declines nor become excited by sizable advances." 22 Having never previously committed 
personal funds to marketable securities, I watched my holdings like a hawk the majority 
of the time. While this alone is no major crime, it certainly is a bad habit for me to 
develop since my ultimate goal as a value investor is to invest with logic without 
consideration of or influence by emotion. 
Because I was paying so much attention to the price activity of certain stocks, I 
ended up letting Mr. Market instruct me a time or two as I made a buy or sell decision. I 
had already made the decision to act, but I let the market influence the timing of my 
trades. Specific examples include both my purchase and sell of Sears. I knew that 
$21.95 was a great price to buy; otherwise, I would not have bought the stock at all. 
However, after watching the stock dart upward on the day, I bought hurriedly for fear that 
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I would miss it altogether. Because I "chased" the stock, I ended up buying near the high 
of the day, from which it subsequently fell 2.5% to close at $21.40 ... and then $19.70 the 
following day. Moreover, even though I still liked the value offered and was not quite 
concentrated enough in Sears, I neglected to buy more when the stock traded down to just 
over $18 per share on March 14 2003, representing a PIE of just 3.8x earnings! 
Basically, I had endured over a 17% loss in my Sears position at that time and was too 
frightened to pull the trigger again. 
Once the price jumped on the news that the company was selling its credit card 
portfolio, I sold half of my position because the stock had quickly jumped over my 
intrinsic value calculation. I failed to consider, however, the true implications of the 
news and the conservatism of my original estimates. I basically sold way too cheap. 
After all, at $33.76, the company was still selling for less than 7x earnings. Had I not let 
my emotions control me and held my position longer, I could have potentially realized 
well over a 150% gain as the stock soared 
to $56 per share. 
This brings me to another 
mistake: excessive activity. Excluding the 
activity to get fully invested, my portfolio 
turnover for the 12-month period was a 
whopping 58.9%. This means that I sold 
over half of my holdings to buy new 
companies at some point in the period. At 
a February 2003 meeting with VT Finance 
Turnover: Symbol 
KO 
PFE 
GE 
HO 
BRK.b 
MCO 
WEN 
HOI 
S 
HCA 
SNV 
BAX 
HCA 
CAH 
HMC 
HMC 
CAH 
TAP.b 
Totals: 
Sum: 
Bought 
$ 1,988.49 $ 
$ 1,47650 $ 
$ 1,694.75 $ 
$ 1,624.25 $ 
$ 2,120.00 $ 
$ 1,35800 !Ii 
$ 1,256.00 $ 
$ 1,576.00 
$ 2,197.00 
$ 1,969.49 
$ 1,931.99 
$ 2,517.99 
$ 1,615.99 
$ 2,547.56 
$ 3,02599 
$ 1,567.79 
$ 2,008.09 
$ 2,627.24 
$35,103.12 
Sold 
2,187.90 MCD 
1,674.93 S 
1,943.91 S 
1 ,622.43 WEN 
2,960.87 BAX 
1 ,946.91 HCA 
2,797.97 SNV 
Less Initial Investment 
$ 15,134.92 
$ 50,23804 
$ (20,000.00) 
$ 30,238.04 
Divide by Avg. Value 
f2 
$ 15,11902 
$ 25,669.56 
58.90% 
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students in Omaha, Buffett explained that it only makes sense to sell when there is 
another investment option that offers better value. 15 If this is true, and if it is only 
common to come up with good investment ideas once per year like Buffett says (quoted 
above), then I must have transferred money too frequently among less-than-spectacular 
investments. Indeed, I did sell my two favorite investments (MCD and S) way too early, 
and, thus, I missed out on some spectacular gains. My failure to "buy and hold" also has 
significant tax implications. Because I neglected to hold many of my investments before 
holding them for one year, my capital gains tax rate will be higher than it would have 
otherwise been. Moreover, because I was so active, I had to pay many more commission 
fees to my broker. Considering that I made a total of 25 trades and commissions cost 
$10.99 per trade, I spent a total of $252.75, or 1.26% of my principle investment in fees 
alone. The lesson here is that it pays to be a patient investor. In his 1991 Letter to 
Shareholders, Buffett claims, "Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock 
market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the 
patient." 9 This is certainly something that I will need to continue to work on. 
Buffett makes a distinction between two types of mistakes-those of 
commission and those of omission. In his October 2003 presentation to DT students, 
Buffett insisted, "Our biggest mistakes have been those of omission rather than 
commission." 14 I believe the same is true for me. Although it does not show up as a loss 
on my performance record, my failure to demonstrate courage and buy a meaningful 
amount of my favorite investments seriously hindered my performance potential. For 
instance, I only purchased $1,356 worth of MCD, which represented a modest 6.8% of 
my total portfolio. Similarly, I only bought $1,622 ofHD and $2,195 of S, representing 
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only 8.1% and 11% of my portfolio, respectively. These were my favorite investments, 
yet they comprised a relatively small portion of my portfolio. I have since become better 
at concentrating, even investing well over 16% of my portfolio into my current CAH 
position. This kind of concentration is necessary to achieve above average results. 
Closing Thoughts 
While the performance of my portfolio is certainly not indicative of future 
potential, grand conclusions about value investing or my ability were never intended. As 
for value investing, the successes of Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett speak for 
themselves. As for me, only time can tell. 
The important lesson here is that managing this portfolio has been an invaluable 
experience in and of itself To be a successful investor, a person needs to practice 
investing. As demonstrated by my own failures, it is not enough to simply understand 
how to value a company and what to look for. Investing a substantial amount of personal 
capital can be very emotional, and it takes a great deal of practice to discipline oneself so 
that emotion does not interfere with clear and simple logic. At a February 2003 meeting 
in Omaha with UT students, when answering a student's question about the value of real-
money investment programs such as the TV A Investment Challenge, Mr. Buffett replied, 
"There is no substitute for losing your own money." 15 While I did not lose any money, I 
certainly agree that there is no substitute for this invaluable learning experience. I would 
strongly encourage anyone interested in investments to put their own money on the line. 
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Appendix 
Transaction Data: 
112612004 Dividend Reoeipt GE 15 
1/1512004 Dividend Receipt CAH 2.34 
1212312003 Dividend Receipt HOI 3.2 
1211312003 Dividend Reoeipt HD 5.25 
1211512003 Dividend Reoeipt KO 11 
12/412003 Dividend Reoeipt PFE 7.5 
121112003 Dividend Receipt HCA 2.3 
1112112003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 175.000 SHARES TAP B @14.35 ~2~27.2.4 
1112112003 Buy or Sell Security SELL 100.000 SHARES SNV @ 28,031 2797.97 
111712003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 35.000 SHARES CAH @ 57.06 -2(:(:8.0~ 
111712003 Buy or Sell Security SELL 50.000 SHARES HCA @ 39.16 1946.91 
1012712003 Dividend Receipt GE 14.25 
1012312003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 80.000 SHARES HMC @ 19.41 ·i56'1.79 
1011512003 Dividend Receipt CAH 1.23 
101112003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 150.000 SHARES HMC @ 20.10 -3025.33 
101112003 Buy or Sell Security SELL 100.000 SHARES BAX @ 29.72 2960.S7 
101112003 Buy or Sell Security SELL 50.000 SHARES \olEN @ 32.67 1622.43 
101112003 Dividend Receipt KO 11 
101112003 Dividend Receipt SNV 16.5 
3/3012003 Dividend Receipt HOI 1.6 
911812003 Dividend Receipt HD 5.25 
91412003 Dividend Receipt PFE 7.5 
91212003 Dividend Receipt HCA 2.3 
811812003 Dividend Receipt \olEN 3 
81812003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 43.000 SHARES CAH @ 58.99 ~254'l.~; 
7125/2003 Dividend Receipt GE 14.25 
711612003 Buy or Sell Security SELL 50.000 SHARES S@ 39.10 1943.91 
711112003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 50.000 SHARES HCA @ 32.10 -If;15.~I$ 
71312003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 100.000 SHARES BAX @ 25_07 -2517.33 
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7/1/2003 Dividend Receipt SNV 16.5 
7/112003 Dividend Receipt S 23 
7/1/2003 Dividend Receipt KO 11 
6/30/2003 Interest Receipt INTEREST CREDIT 0.07 
6/26/2003 Dividend Receipt HD 4.5 
6/20/2003 Dividend Receipt HOI 1.6 
6/18/2003 Buy or Sell Security SELL 50.000 SHARES S @ 33.76 1674.93 
6/18/2003 Buy or Sell Security SELL 100.000 SHARES MCD @ 22.01 2187.9 
6/5/2003 Dividend Receipt PFE 7.5 
6/2/2003 Dividend Receipt HCA 1.3 
6/2/2003 Interest Receipt INTEREST CREDIT 0.05 
5/19/2003 Dividend Receipt 'WEN :) 
4/28/2003 Interest Receipt INTEREST CREDIT 0.36 
412512003 Dio.lidend Receipt GE 14.25 
4125/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 100.000 SHARES SNV @ 19.19 ·1931 :3:3 
4/23/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 65.000 SHARES HCA@30.10 ·j%3M 
4/1/2003 Dividend Receipt KO 11 
3/31/2003 Interest Receipt INTEREST CREDIT 0.39 
3/28/2003 Dividend Receipt HD 4.5 
3/24/2003 Dividend Receipt HOI 1.4 
3/3/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 100.000 SHARES S @ 21.95 _218;; 
3/3/2003 Interest Receipt INTEREST CREDIT 1.16 
2/24/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 40.000 SHARES HOI @ 39.35 ·'5j·!; 
2/19/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 50.000 SHARES 'WEN @ 25.08 ·:258 
2/19/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 100.000 SHARES MCD @ 13.56 ~1J58 
2/19/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 1.000 SHARES BRK B @ 2118.00 ·2;21) 
Miscellaneous Corporate COMMISSION ADJUSTMENT 
2/10/2003 Action 774684025 1094194495 10.99 
2110/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 75.000 SHARES HD @ 21.63 .iI32<1.2f< 
2/10/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 75.000 SHARES GE @ 22.57 ·;~94 75 
2/10/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 50.000 SHARES PFE @ 28.49 ·H76.5 
2/10/2003 Buy or Sell Security BUY 50.000 SHARES KO @ 39.51 .1:3:n~~1 
2/3/2003 Interest Receipt INTEREST CREDIT 0.11 
1/30/2003 Cash Receipt 20000 
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The Portfolio 
2/1112004 
Symbol 
KO $ 51.80 
Price Shares Value\iVeight PIE 
50 $ 2,590.00 . 8.26% 
Div Div. Yield Beta Weighted Beta 
24.67 0.88 1.70% 0.286 0.0236 
PFE ...... J. 38.15 50$1,907.50 6.09% 16.03 .. 0.68 1.78% 0.378 0.0230 
GEJ 33.08 
HD $ 36.83 
75 $ 2,481.00 • 7.92% 
······}5):2,762.25 8.81 % 18.69 0.8 2.42% 1.103 0.0873 17.97 0.28 0.76% 1.401 0.1235 
BRKB $ 3,057.00 
HDI$53.36 
1 $ 3,05700 9.75% 
40 $ 2,134.40 • "6.810/0' 
24.68 0 0.00% 0.415 0.0405 
16.94 0.32 0.60% 1.095 0.0746 
HCA $ 43.89 65 $ 2,852.85 . 9.10% 13.63 0.52 118% 0.15 0.0137 
CAH $ 65.75 78 $ 5,128.50 . 16.36% 15.51 0.12 0.18% 0.105 0.0172 
HMC $ 21.62 230 $ 4,972.60 . 15.87% 9.7 0.16 0.74% 0.531 0.0843 
TAP.B $ 18.20 175 $ 3,185.00 • 10.16% 7.95 0.32 1.76% 0.6 0.0610 
Cash 
......... $ ... 268.01 • 0.86% 
Total: • $ 31,339.11' 100.00% 16.577 0.5486 
Return Information 
Beginni~g Cash Balance: $ 
Performance: ···5t;.70% (After Fees) 
,....... . .~" ............ , ............ . 
S&P 500 Performance: 
div 
2/1112003 
2/1112004 
........ adjusted 
829.2 
1157.76 
18 
1175.76 
................... 
4t.79% 
Cash 
Basis: 
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Symbol 
MCD 
S 
WEN 
BAX 
HCA 
SNV 
Appendix 
Realized Gains 
Basis Proceeds 
$ ..... 1,358 .qq ... $ 2,187.90 • 
............................... 
$ 2,197.00 $ 1,674.93 
...... 
.. $ ...... 1,~43.91 
$ 1,256.00 $ 1,622.43 
$ 
........ ~,517}9 $ 2,960.87 • 
.......................... 
$ 1,615.99 $ 1,946.91 • 
$ 
........ 1,~31.99 $ ),797.97 
Profit % Gain 
$ 829.90 61.11 % 
$ 1,421.84 64.72% 
$ 366.43 29.17% 
$ 442.88 17.59% 
$ 330.92 20.48%· 
$ 865.98 44.82% 
Totals: $1q,8T6.~? $ .15,1}4.~? $4,~?!-95 39.15%· 
Unrealized Gains 
Value Price Paid Basis Unreal GIL 
50 $ 2,590.00 $ 39.51 $ 1,975.50 $ 614.50 
50 $1,~qr5Q $ 29.49 $1,474):iQ $ 433.00 
75 $ 2,481.00 $ 22.57 $ 1,692.75 $ 788.25 
75 .$2l62.25 $ 21.63J1 ,62~)?$1)40.00 
1 $ 3,057.00 $ 2,118.00 $ 2,118.00 $ 939.00 
40 $ ....... 2,1)4AQ $ 39.35 $1):i74.QO $ 560.40. 
65 $ 2,852.85 $ 30.10 $ 1,956.50$896.35 
78 $5,128.fjQ $ 58.12JA,53:3-6? $ 594.84. 
230 $ 4,972.60 $ 19.86 $ 4,567.80 $ 404.80. 
175 $},18?Oq $ 14.95 $2,616)5 $ 568.75 
$ 268.01 
$29,000.09. Total Value: .. $ ..... 31,33~.11 .... 
% GIL 
31.11 % 
35.60% 
45.81% 
13.12% 
